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The Society of Jesus has promulgated the Universal Apostolic Preferences (UAPs) for the decade 2019-29. 
We know what the UAPs are: to seek God, walk with the poor, accompany youth, and collaborate in the care 
of the earth. And we know what they are for: the ongoing conversion of persons and institutions in their 
commitment to the mission of reconciliation of justice. But what, exactly, is a “preference” anyhow? In this 
reflection, I draw on the moral tradition of virtue ethics to argue that the preferences are best understood as 
“practices” or, in other words, as the fundamental actions by which crucial virtues like mercy and justice are 
developed in persons and in institutions. I also argue that seeing the preferences as practices in the context of 
virtue ethics opens up fruitful possibilities for fostering engagement with the UAPs at Jesuit institutions of 




So, what is a “preference” anyhow?  
 
The Society of Jesus has promulgated the 
Universal Apostolic Preferences (UAPs) for the 
decade 2019-29. We know what the UAPs are: To 
show the way to God through the Spiritual 
Exercises and discernment; to walk with the poor, 
the outcasts of the world, and those whose dignity 
has been violated, in a mission of reconciliation 
and justice; to accompany young people in the 
creation of a hope-filled future, and to collaborate 
in the care of our Common Home.1  
 
We know what the UAPs are for. In his Letter of 
Promulgation, Jesuit Superior General Arturo 
Sosa said the UAPs are a means for “incarnating 
the mission of reconciliation and justice in all the 
apostolic services to which we, along with others, 
have been sent.”2 Further, he emphasized that the 
UAPs are best understood as “orientations that go 
beyond ‘doing something’ and enable us to 
achieve our transformation as persons, as religious 
communities, and as apostolic works and 
institutions in which we collaborate with others.”3 
 
Still we should ask: what specifically is a 
“preference”? In the context of the United States, 
this question arises in part because of culture. As a 
matter of usage, the word “preference” in English 
is deployed in casual conversation to indicate 
something that would be better to choose than 
something else, but that is, nonetheless, not a 
requirement. This common usage suggests an 
attenuated sense of the UAPs: That they are good, 
but not necessary options in the life of Jesuit 
institutions of higher education. Yet, that way of 
putting things is not consistent with the obvious 
central importance given to them in Father Sosa’s 
Letter of Promulgation.  
 
In the U.S. context, another problem of 
interpretation arises from the widespread 
academic and popular use of rational choice 
theory and its accompanying language of 
“preferences.” In the logic of that theory, each 
person is rendered as an economic actor who 
orders preferences in terms of rational egoism. 
Furthermore, this egoistic ordering applies 
whether one’s preferences are for profit-making or 
for altruism. In any case, the logic of preferences 
in rational choice theory is a far cry from the logic 
of preferences in Father Sosa’s Letter of 
Promulgation: In the former, preferences 
relentlessly direct us toward ourselves; in the 
latter, the UAPs direct us toward others for the 
sake of these others.4 
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After having given many presentations on the 
UAPs to students, staff, and faculty at Santa Clara 
University during the 2020-2021 academic year, I 
think it is essential to address such possible 
cultural misconceptions. Doing so clears the space 
for the reception of the UAPs.  However, I think 
two more steps of identification are crucial. One is 
to note that the use of the word “preference” in 
the UAPs is immediately derived from the classic 
Jesuit process of discernment and its 
corresponding choice of the best means for 
responding to a challenge to the Gospel in a 
particular time and place. In that sense, in the face 
of the challenges facing the Society of Jesus from 
2019 to 2029, these four preferences were chosen 
as the best means of response (i.e., they were the 
best “choices” or “preferences”) among many 
other options. Such a selection was undertaken in 
a fashion consistent with the emphasis on 
reconciliation and justice at the Jesuits’ 36th 
General Congregation in 2016.5  
 
UAPs as Practices in the Context of an Ethics 
of Virtue 
 
A second step of identification is also important: 
Understanding the UAPs as practices in the 
context of what is called a virtue ethics or an 
ethics of virtue. To identify the UAPs in this way 
is not simply to make an ethical point. Instead, 
doing so can reveal possibilities for engagement 
with the UAPs at Jesuit institutions of higher 
education.  
 
Ethics across time and cultures have classically 
affirmed three distinct kinds of moral reasoning: 
one based on principles and moral laws, another 
on consequences, and a third on virtues and vices. 
In the last few decades, there has been a huge 
resurgence of interest in virtue ethics.6 The word 
“virtue” may sound prudish to many, however 
that resonance is a residue of a Victorian and 
modern appropriation of an ancient moral 
tradition. Indeed, the emphasis on virtues and 
vices as a way to think about the meaning of living 
a good life goes back to such figures as Aristotle 
in the fourth century BCE and St. Thomas 
Aquinas in the 13th century.  
 
An ethics of virtue asks us to consider what it 
means in our time and place to be a person of 
good character, and thus asks us what virtues or 
abiding traits of character ought to constitute such 
a person; what practices or habits inculcate such 
virtues; what kinds of communities promote the 
practices that develop virtues; and what stories or 
symbols provide the examples or inspiration that 
point us toward the good life. The return to virtue 
ethics has been driven in part by a sense that an 
ethics of principles or consequences alone tends 
to leave out the most important aspect of any 
ethics: actual human beings in all their embodied, 
affective, and communal capacities.  
 
In his book Go and Do Likewise: Jesus and Ethics, the 
late moral theologian William Spohn argued that 
virtue ethics combined with spirituality is the best 
way to appropriate the moral vision of the New 
Testament (which, in any case, is the ultimate basis 
for the moral vision of Jesuit higher education).7 
To be sure, the New Testament includes ethics of 
principles and of consequences.  Nevertheless, 
Jesus did not come teaching timeless and abstract 
truths, but instead proclaimed a dramatic new 
divine initiative that sought the heart and 
demanded love in action.8 An ethics of virtue, 
Spohn argues, allows for both dimensions: The 
interior change of affection and the exterior 
manifestation of action. Moreover, combining an 
ethics of virtue with spirituality allows for the pre-
eminent role of grace in the moral life. In 
Christian terms, living out an ethics of virtue is 
not a process of self-mastery but instead a pilgrim 
journey of imperfection, always waiting on the 
transformative possibilities of what Spohn calls 
the “patient grace of God.”9  
 
The wording of the UAPs refers explicitly or 
implicitly to many virtues, including reverence, 
humility, prudence, justice, mercy, 
accompaniment, hope, creativity, care for the 
earth, and collaboration. When we say that 
someone has such virtues, we are referring to 
more than a one-off action of, for instance, justice 
or mercy. Instead, we are referring to an abiding 
interior disposition of a person to be just or 
merciful—a disposition that in turn is consistently 
reflected in the exterior actions—the just and 
merciful practices—of that person. Virtue ethics 
assumes that we are free and responsible and 
constitute ourselves by the practices we pursue (in 
a Christian sense, such constituting occurs in 
interaction with divine grace).10 Who we are and 
what we do are inseparably connected. This 
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language of the union of interiority and exteriority 
is frequently present in Father Sosa’s writing on 
the UAPs.  
 
In Go and Do Likewise, Spohn correlates Gospel 
virtues like forgiveness, compassion, and justice 
with an array of practices that loom large in the 
stories of Jesus: his table fellowship with sinners; 
his healing the sick; his feeding the hungry. Other 
examples abound. Disciples of Jesus, Spohn 
argues, have a template before them. They can see 
the virtues that distinguish a follower of Jesus and 
they can see the practices—and imagine analogous 
practices—by which to foster such virtues. 
Moreover, they can turn to the stories of the 
Gospels to point the way: The meaning of the 
virtue of love is not conveyed by a theory but in 
the account of the Good Samaritan (Luke 10:25-
37).11 In turn, the virtues, practices, and stories are 
sustained by a community of disciples. We can 
draw important inferences from this for thinking 
about the UAPs in terms of the virtues, practices, 
stories, and communities that constitute Jesuit 
higher education.  
 
It is important to note one other key factor about 
practices that is relevant to the UAPs. For 
practices to foster the development of virtues, 
Spohn argues, they must be done with a right 
intention.12 Here, he especially has in mind how 
practices can slide easily into becoming 
instrumental techniques aimed at self-interested 
perfectionism.13 By contrast, he says, practices will 
not be transformative if they are aimed at personal 
transformation. Instead, practices become 
transformative when they are done for the sake of 
the practice itself and for the disinterested sake of 
another. Thus, for instance, the third UAP—to 
accompany youth in the creation of a hope-filled 
future—isn’t simply about producing hopeful 
youth at institutions of Jesuit higher education. 
Instead, it’s about approaching the practice of 
accompaniment as something worthy and 
enjoyable in itself. Moreover, it’s also about the 
disinterested intention of accompaniment: How 
can we be present to the youth at Jesuit 
institutions of higher education in ways that foster 
their creativity, which is surely the key to a future 
of hope? The goal of graduating more hope-filled 
students cannot be separated from the intentions 
by which we go about practices.  
 
UAPs as Practices in an Ethics of Virtue: 
Practical Implications 
 
I have noted that it is clarifying to understand the 
UAPs as practices within the framework of an 
ethics of virtue oriented toward the Ignatian 
mission of justice and mercy. What are practical 
implications of such a claim? How might Jesuit 
institutions of higher education promote 
engagement with the UAPs among students, staff, 
and faculty?  
 
UAPs Are Not One-Offs and Neither are Virtues 
 
It is no doubt tempting to organize a talk on the 
UAPs or to fund a study on them or to check a 
box and do something in a one-off way related to 
each of the preferences.  We must resist this 
temptation. If we think of the UAPs as practices 
in the context of an ethics of virtue, we can see 
that we have to think more long-term. We are not 
going to develop the virtues of mercy and justice 
overnight. Virtues take time and repeated practice 
and we need to settle in for the long haul of 
intentional, ongoing transformation. 
 
First Practices, Then Priorities 
 
Father Sosa has said that the UAPs are not to be 
understood as strategic priorities.  Still, it cannot 
be the case that Jesuit institutions of higher 
education would not establish strategic priorities. 
Instead, I think the UAPs are meant to ensure that 
strategic priorities arise from an authentic practice 
of mission. Jesuit moral theologian James Keenan 
has said we come to understand more deeply the 
demands of the virtue of justice through our 
practice of justice.14  So it goes for identifying the 
strategic priorities of our shared mission of 
reconciliation and justice: We will strategically 
align our priorities with this mission if we actually 
practice mercy and justice.  
 
Virtues, Practices, and Many Traditions 
 
Virtues and practices emerge from moral and 
religious traditions. Of course, the UAPs are 
practices aimed at fostering virtues that emerge 
out of the Jesuit and Catholic moral and religious 
traditions.  There are many points of comparison 
between the understanding of virtues like mercy 
and justice in the Catholic tradition and the 
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understanding of these virtues in such traditions 
as Judaism, Islam, Hinduism, Buddhism, and 
other faiths.  Jesuit institutions of higher 
education welcome students, staff, and faculty of 
many different backgrounds. It could be fruitful to 
engage in conversations about the UAPs with 
students, staff, and faculty from many different 
traditions. What in the virtues in their traditions 
remind us of the virtues pointed to in the UAPs? 
What practices in their traditions are reminiscent 
of our invitations to seek God and practice 
discernment; or to walk with the dispossessed?  
 
Virtues, Practices, and Stories 
 
As Spohn notes, we learn about virtues primarily 
from stories. By thinking of the UAPs as practices 
in the context of an ethics of virtue, we are also 
invited to consider a wide range of stories that 
contain such practices and reveal related virtues. 
What stories from our students’ lives reveal 
practices like accompanying the poor? What 
stories from our colleagues’ lives include the 
practices of seeking God and discernment? 
Identifying such stories across many traditions 
could be an excellent way to foster formation in 




In this reflection, I have argued that the UAPs can 
be accurately and helpfully understood as practices 
within the context of an ethics of virtue. By seeing 
the UAPs in such a light, we can understand better 
what they are asking of all those in Jesuit higher 
education.  Furthermore, we can come to think 
more creatively about how to foster engagement 
with the UAPs in the many different contexts 
faced by our campuses and communities.   
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